

## PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXATION RUSSIA'S FORMULA

No Great Obstacles  
To Peace Between  
Austria and Russia  
And in the  
Balkans

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It would be a very great mistake to dismiss as merely visionary the demand of the Russian Revolution that there should be world peace and that this world peace should be based upon the principle of no annexation and no indemnity. It is true that at the moment this proposal finds a hearing only in Russia, and is rejected by Germany and by the Allied nations alike, although for very different reasons. But the situation may be altogether changed if winter comes without a decision on either side or any unmistakable evidence of the approach of a decision.

We have seen in recent weeks a very clear evidence that Austria is ready to make peace on the basis of things as they were in July, 1914. We have the firm declaration of the Russian Revolution in favor of such a programme. Here are the two nations whose quarrel opened the way to the conflict prepared to give over the struggle, and it should be remarked that with these declarations or intimations there vanish some of the most extensive proposals for the alteration of the map of Europe.

## Turkey and Russia Near Accord

At the present moment Russia has abandoned her claim to the Straits and to Constantinople; she no longer asks to establish her rule on the ruins of Turkey in Europe and merely asks free passage through the Straits, which the Turks and their allies are prepared to give her. Thus expires any reason for the prolongation of a war between Turkey and Russia, for the problem of Armenia is not difficult to settle.


In abandoning her claim upon Galicia Russia surrenders any plan that would urge Austria to continue at war with Russia, for with the surrender of the Galician dream Russia very manifestly throws over all Rumanian dreams of expansion at the expense of Hungary. Since the Russians have declined to make the cause of the Slavs in Galicia a basis for continued war, there is small chance that they will long insist upon war merely to do for the Rumanians of Transylvania and Bukovina what they will not do for their own brothers in Austrian territory.

Granted that the present Russian proposal prevails in Russia and continues to be the driving force of Russian policy, we may dismiss at once all but one of the great proposals for changes in the map of Europe between the Danube and the Baltic. This single exception is the case of Poland. The Russians have agreed to the liberation of Poland; they have frankly and freely and in the spirit of the revolution indorsed the idea of Polish freedom. But this must mean the freedom of the Poles in Austria as well as in Russian Poland. No semi-autonomous Polish state, actually under German tutelage, actually bound to the Prussian autocracy, will satisfy the ideas of the Russian Revolution. Nor is it less clear that once a portion of Poland is free the Austrian Poles, the ablest, most intelligent, most energetic of all, will insist upon joining the new kingdom. For Austria to refuse would be to throw the great Polish element into the opposition, and in recent years it has only been by a coalition of the Poles with the Magyars and Germans of the Dual Monarchy that the Hapsburg empire has been preserved.

## A New Poland

By far the most likely outcome of the present situation, granted that there is no collapse on the part of Russia or of the Central Powers, granted that the war goes on until the end of the campaign, is a new peace proposal emanating from Russia or from Austria, or coming from both, suggesting the creation of a new Poland to consist of Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia, a state which will be guaranteed by Austria and by Russia, and possibly by Germany. Such a proposal would at once eliminate all question of victory or defeat in the war. Russia would lose 50,000 square miles and 12,000,000 people, Austria 20,000 square miles and 8,250,000, or 30,000 square miles and 9,000,000 souls if Bukovina were included, and Bukovina might very well be assigned to Rumania in exchange for that Bulgarian territory taken at the time of the Treaty of Bucharest and retaken by the Bulgars last year.

Such a solution would erect between Austria and Russia a Polish state of at least 20,000,000, nearly three-quarters of whom would be Polish. It would, to be sure, join to the Poles at least 3,000,000 Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia, who would not welcome the change with enthusiasm. Yet they have been at all times dominated by the Poles of Western Galicia and their ancestors were included in the old Polish kingdom. Between Austria and the buffer state of Poland would stand



The two arrows show the directions of the two Italian operations of the last ten days. The upper arrow shows the first attack made between Tolmino and the heights above Gorizia. The lower arrow shows the attack made on Thursday of last week between Gorizia and the sea, which started from the ground captured in the Italian offensive of last year.

the wall of the Carpathians, and the menace of Russian attack would be removed or at the least much reduced.

As for the Serbian problem, on the basis of no annexations, it would find easy solution: unsupported by the Russians, the Serbian dreams of a Greater Serbia would not long survive to keep a conquered people in the war. Granted that Russia and Austria were agreed to make peace without conquests, it would not be difficult to assign to Serbia that window on the Adriatic at Durazzo which was won at the time of the First Balkan War and denied by the Conference of London. With a gateway on the sea, with a practical union with Montenegro, Serbia would emerge from the war with economic freedom. And to balance her acquisitions she could afford to make peace with Bulgaria on the basis of the agreement which preceded the First Balkan War and assigned Macedonia south of Uskub and Pristina to the Bulgars.

## The Way to an End

Bulgaria on her part would acquire the Silistria strip, taken from her by Rumania, the Macedonian area included in the agreement with Serbia and the Kavala district, assigned to her in the arrangements after the First Balkan War and lost by her venture into the Second.

I do not mean to forecast that all these things are likely to happen. What I am now endeavoring to indicate is that the principle enunciated by the Russian Revolution and tacitly accepted by the Austrians offers no great obstacle to a general pacification in the Balkans and on the eastern frontiers of war. Granted that Austria and Russia are ready to make peace on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities; granted that each is ready to meet the Polish situation in the sense of the other, that is, of mutual surrender of territory, then the way to an end is easy.

A great deal has been said lately about the disappearance of Russia from the war, very little about the withdrawal of Austria. This is, in the main, because there is a profound conviction that Austria has lost her freedom of decision and is now a German vassal. But much of this subordination to Germany is unmistakably due to the fact that the Allied programme calls for the destruction of Austria, and thus there is left to Austria no course save that based upon German assistance. As long as German aid is necessary to save Austria from destruction there is small chance that Austria will change sides or make peace.

But if Russia, and Russia is the real peril, offers peace on the terms Russian Revolutionists propose, terms I have indicated, will Austria still care to go on with the struggle, which is daily destroying all hope of an early rehabilitation of the Dual Monarchy and steadily carrying it nearer to

economic ruin and political anarchy? The Hungarians are certain to fight as long as it is a case of losing Transylvania, if they quit, and as long as peace means bringing the Slav neighbor to the Carpathians. But assured of the integrity of their own kingdom and of the creation of a buffer Polish state between them and the Russians, will they not insist upon peace before their country is totally ruined?

It seems to me that the Russian Revolution has opened some very interesting speculations that are not all signposts to German success. Probably the Allied purpose to destroy Austria-Hungary, to liberate the oppressed nationalities and to erect a number of small free states has been destroyed by the Russian Revolution and by the adoption by the Russian Revolutionists of the programme of no annexations. But to what extent was this a wise or sound purpose? Hungary and Bohemia without seacoasts, German Austria left a fragment with frontiers joining Germany—would these be foundations on which to build a permanent peace?

On the contrary, if Russian Revolutionists, by renouncing Russian ambitions, make separate peace possible for Austria-Hungary and by renouncing Balkan ambitions leave the Turk with no reason to continue in the war, will they not have dealt a fatal blow to that Mitteleuropa scheme of the Germans, and is it not likely that Austria herself will find a way of escape from German chains? Once assured of the end of the threat to her own existence, will Austria-Hungary care to continue the war to aid the Germans to realize ambitions which menace the future independence of Austria and bring no promise of immediate or even remote profit?

## Austria's Weakness

We see that Russia is now become the weak link in the Allied chain; but ought we not quite as clearly to perceive that Austria remains, as she has always been, a weak link in the Central Alliance, while Turkey, assured of her existence, of the safety of her capital, by Russia's renunciation, resumes her freedom to bargain? Like Austria, she is no longer bound to the Central Alliance by considerations of life and death; like Austria, she is now bound only by the prospect of eventual profit, and where is this to be found?

In sum, a policy of no annexation is now quite as satisfactory to the Austrians as to the Russians. An independent Poland may soon come to have for Austria the same character that it has for Russia, erecting a buffer state between Russia and Austria, disposing thus of 9,000,000 Slavs and thus restoring the ascendancy of the Magyar and the German in the Dual Monarchy. This might easily seem a safe solution of the war problems, and on such a basis Austria and Russia might easily make peace and their peace might easily

bring about an end of the war in the Balkans and thus remove from the battle line Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece.

In all this I have not so far reckoned with German influence and German policy. Let us recognize at once that all that has been said is directly counter to German purpose and German interest. The Russian Revolution has disorganized the Russian military establishment and given Germany a new hope of victory. Victory for Germany means annexations and indemnities. If there are no indemnities and annexations for Germany, she will have lost the war on her own statement, because she entered it to win a proper place in the sun for the German people, and she sought this place because she found that which she occupied too "cribbled and confined."

## German Hopes

To-day Germany hopes to annex Lithuania and to dominate an autonomous Poland; she hopes to secure hegemony in the Balkans, to reign in Constantinople and to turn Asia Minor into a German colony. In the same sense she has not yet surrendered the hope of keeping Belgium and the iron districts of French Lorraine. Peace on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities—and she hopes to get a huge indemnity for evacuating what she does not desire in France, and for evacuating all France and Belgium, if she has to retire—is a lost war for Germany.

But the cry for peace without indemnity has already been raised in Germany, the cry for peace without annexation has been heard for a long time. It is raised by those who are convinced that there is no longer a good chance of getting indemnities and even less chance of adding territories. It grows loud when the German prospects are dismal; it falls away to a whisper again when German prospects mount as they have in recent days, since the Allied advance on the West front has been temporarily slowed down, the Russian Revolution has disorganized and paralyzed the Russian army and the submarine has begun to make itself felt as a very grave and unmistakable threat to Allied existence.

But without attempting to look into the future or to prophesy, let us consider what may be the case six months hence if the most likely thing happens. Suppose Germany does not win the war by her submarines, suppose the Allied offensive does not reach the Rhine or clear Belgium and all of France. Suppose Russia and Austria stand facing each other more or less quietly on the Eastern front and Italian and Austrian armies keep their present positions. Is it not likely then that Germany will find herself compelled by internal pressure to accept the Russian proposal, to advocate peace without annexation or indemnity and thus hope to divide her enemies?

For it is clear that if the submarines do not win the war or demonstrate that they can win it before December, Germany will have to face another year of war with American troops coming up and American resources joined to those of the Allies. She will have to face great actual and greater prospective superiority in numbers, guns and munitions on the part of her foes; she will have to face a blood tax upon her population greater than any nation has had to bear or will have to bear; for as the British are taking a portion of the burden off the French this year we shall take our part next year.

To me it seems very clear that next December we shall have a new situation. We shall have Austria ready to make peace with Russia on the basis that I have indicated—no indemnities and no annexations. We shall have Turkey, and probably Bulgaria, in the same state of mind. We shall have Serbia exhausted and abandoned by Russia, with little hope of realizing her old dreams. In a word, we shall have a situation in which, by renouncing their own ambitions, the Russians will have removed all occasion for war between themselves and three of the German allies.

Will Germany then run the risk of losing her allies by insisting that they stay in the war with her to their cost and her possible profit? If she does the Allies may well welcome this situation as insuring a break between Austria and Germany and the escape of Turkey, and probably of Austria, from the German domination. A truly independent Austria would be a gain for the Allies that would actually mean winning the war, were nothing else attained.

## Peace with Russia in December

But it seems to me German policy will be quite different. By December, if she has not won the war or laid her hands upon the prize, if she is not able to show her population inevitable instead of prospective victory, it seems to me that Germany will have to listen to the proposals of Russia, indorsed by Austria, and to proclaim her own readiness to accept peace without annexation. Moreover, if she does this, she can, in turn, hope to profit by the disarray this may cause among her foes.

To-day Germany is embarrassed because she is not prepared to accept the Russian proposal; she still hopes for indemnity and for annexation. She is thus unable to meet Russia on the basis that would lead Russia to make a separate peace, she runs the risk of letting Russia get back into the war, and she is conscious of the growing determination of Austria to have peace on a basis that now assures her integrity and is obtainable.

To-morrow, when hope may have vanished, Germany, if she has kept Russia in play and not let Russian public

opinion get into the war again, can propose to accept the Russian proposal and thus insure the support of her allies and not at all improbably bring Russia to the point of making a separate peace. This I firmly believe to be the German programme. For the summer the Russian revolutionists are to be kept in play; the German elements at home who desire peace on Russian terms, the Austrian and Turkish allies are to be kept in the fight by the promise of assured victory, by glowing accounts of the achievements of the submarine. But if all these hopes prove vain, then Germany will, as winter comes and the campaigns end, boldly proclaim the Russian proposal of peace without annexation or indemnity; when she does this the Allies will have to wrestle with the gravest crisis they have yet had to face.

## Allies' Fundamental Purposes

For there are certain of the Allied purposes in this war that are fundamental. France is resolved to retake that portion of her own territory torn from her in 1870 and those populations who are now German by force, not by choice. Italy is resolved to liberate the Italians of the Trentino and of Trieste. Great Britain's colonies, having removed the deadly peril of German colonies in Africa and in the Pacific, are determined that these old perils shall not be restored. Australia would leave the empire rather than consent to a return to Germany of the islands once the Kaiser's. South Africa, having conquered German West Africa, long a headquarters of plotting, will in no case return the lands taken by Boer and Briton alike.

We touch here upon the basis of future peril. Having renounced Constantinople, having turned her back to her Slav brethren in the Balkans and in Galicia, Russia may demand a similar course on the part of France toward the people of the Pays Messin, and of Italy toward the inhabitants of the Trentino and Trieste districts. If she does, then Germany, having adopted the Russian policy, perforce, may be able to negotiate a separate peace with Russia and thus break the alliance of her enemies. Obviously this is her second line of action, if she does not win the war in the field or on the sea this summer.

If Germany proposes peace without annexation or indemnity this winter, then she will expect, not unreasonably, to be aided by a certain fraction of the people of France, of Great Britain, of Italy and of the United States. The question that will be raised then will be whether the peoples of these nations are willing and ready to bear the burden of another year of war to obtain a fair settlement of the old questions of Alsace-Lorraine, of the Italian Irredenta and for Great Britain a permanent abolition of the German menace through German colonial establish-

Crisis for Allies at  
End of Year When  
Germany Seeks  
To Detach  
Russia

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ments—always provided that Austrian and Turkish defection has abolished the Mitteleuropa peril. For while this remains a possibility it seems to me any discussion of peace is impossible, since any peace preserving this Central European Empire would be but a truce and a sham.

Germany means to fight now because she thinks she can gain new territory and obtain indemnities. Her population is prepared to fight on for the present in this hope. But it is plain that the will to fight will not endure beyond a fixed point in time and sacrifice. Will the people of the Allied nations have the German resolution, when their turn comes to face the question of peace without annexation and without indemnity? This seems to me to be the great question of the future, and I believe that America's course in the next few months will decide the question in no small degree for the Allies.

If the United States has begun to send troops to Europe in considerable numbers, if American naval support has materially aided the Allies in moderating the submarine menace, then it seems to me that there is a sound basis for believing that the Allies will go forward until the wrongs of 1871 and of the Austro-Italian settlement are righted. Then, and only then, there will be a prospect of the indemnification by Germany of both Belgium and France for the most cruel and wanton destruction in two centuries.

## Russia's Renunciation

Meantime no one should mistake the change in the situation. Russia has renounced conquests, and this has removed the larger number of questions that stood in the way of peace by negotiation. Austria has indicated a similar state of mind, and there is sound reason for believing that the Austrian desire for peace may steadily grow and as it grows open an ever widening chasm between Vienna and Berlin. Turkey, through the Russian decision, has escaped from peril of destruction, and Rumanian hopes have been dashed. Aside from the Polish question there is now no really great barrier in the way of a peace without annexation or indemnity so far as Russia, Austria and Turkey are concerned. An equitable arrangement between Rumania and Bulgaria and between Serbia and Bulgaria is easily attainable.

Russia has then destroyed the Allied plan to demolish Austria-Hungary, and the liberation of the Slav and Latin populations becomes only remotely possible, unless Russia reenters the war with the old programme. It will be advantageous to the Allies, this new situation, even with the defeat of their Austrian plans, if it leads to an escape of Austria from German leading-strings. It will be perilous for Germany just so long as the Germans risk a new Russian attack by a refusal to accept the Russian formula.

But if Germany finds herself still far from decisive victory next winter and adopts the Russian programme, then she will have the support of all her allies and will, by accepting the Russian formula, threaten to break the solidarity of the ranks against her. So long as she pursues a policy of aggrandizement she will have to endure the opposition of certain elements at home, an opposition which will increase or diminish as she wins or loses in her campaigns. When she changes her ground she will be aided by the elements among her enemies which favor peace without annexation as a moral doctrine.

## An Exhaustion of Germany

All things considered, however, it seems to me necessary to recognize that Russia has proposed a new doctrine which is destined to have great and growing importance in the European situation. It will not be of decisive influence while Germany still believes she can win some booty in land or treasure; it will have great influence, when the time comes, as I believe it presently will, in which Germany recognizes that her greatest possible profit from the war can be a draw and the Allies have to decide whether they will endure still greater burdens to realize their aim to reimburse Belgium and France and to restore the lost provinces of the Italians and the French. We shall come to this problem in December, at the latest, it seems to me, and as I said a moment ago, the real decision may be based upon the extent to which America has begun to throw her force to the support of the French. If the Allies decline the German adaptation of the Russian formula and insist upon the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino and Trieste, we shall probably have another year of war and an exhaustion of Germany, which will mean a repetition of the conditions in Germany that existed at the close of the Thirty Years' War.